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Introduction 
In recent years, experimental philosophers have tried to determine whether ordinary people take 
freedom of will and moral responsibility to be compatible or incompatible with determinism. The 
results show that folk intuitions about moral responsibility are prone to contradiction, being 
sensitive to a surprising variety of factors (Nichols 2004, Nahmias et. al. 2005, Nahmias et. al. 
2007, Nichols and Knobe 2007). This has led philosophers to debate whether people can have 
any unified concept of moral responsibility (Nelkin 2007, Knobe et. al. 2007, Doris and Knobe 
forthcoming). 
Elsewhere, we have presented an analysis of our everyday concept of moral responsibility that 
provides a unified explanation of paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility and accounts for the 
force of both typical excuses and the most influential skeptical arguments against moral 
responsibility or for incompatibilism. In this article, we suggest that it also explains the divergent 
and apparently incoherent set of intuitions revealed by some recent experiments. If our 
hypothesis is correct, the surprising variety of judgments stems from a unified concept of moral 
responsibility. 
 In what follows, we will briefly review the experimental results that are relevant for our 
purposes, sketch the model, and explain how the results are just what we could expect given that 
model.  
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Abstract vs. Concrete 
Recent studies by Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe (2007) suggest that whether people take 
agents to be responsible for their actions in a deterministic scenario depends on whether these 
actions are described abstractly or concretely. Subjects were first presented with the deterministic 
scenario:  
 
Imagine a universe (Universe A) in which everything that happens is completely caused by 
whatever happened before it. This is true from the very beginning of the universe, so what 
happened in the beginning of the universe caused what happened next, and so on right up 
until the present. For example one day John decided to have French Fries at lunch. Like 
everything else, this decision was completely caused by what happened before it. So, if 
everything in this universe was exactly the same up until John made his decision, then it had 
to happen that John would decide to have French Fries. (Nichols and Knobe 2007: 669) 
 
Subjects in the “abstract” condition were then asked whether, in Universe A, it is possible for a 
person to be fully morally responsible for his or her actions, whereas subjects in the “concrete” 
condition were asked whether a man called Bill intentionally kills his wife and children because 
he has become attracted to his secretary is fully responsible for killing his family. In the abstract 
condition, 86% percent answered no; in the concrete condition, 72% answered yes (Nichols & 
Knobe 2007:670). 
The puzzle is to explain why people assign responsibility in the concrete but not in the abstract 
cases when the universe is portrayed the same way in both.1 
 
                                                
1 A number of philosophers have thought that different perspectives yield different judgments concerning moral 
responsibility. When we take the God’s perspective on things, Daniel Dennett (2003: 92f) argues, responsibility 
seems undermined by inevitability. Sir Peter Strawson ([1965] 2003: 79f) argues that judgments of responsibility 
belongs to a participatory attitude toward people rather than an objective one. And on one interpretation, Kant (1785: 
97-101) takes our autonomy to belong to the practical rather than the theoretical perspective (Cf. Korsgaard 1996: 
162-7). 
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High affect vs. Low affect 
Another result from Nichols and Knobe (2007) displays differences in folk intuitions about “high 
affect” and “low affect” cases presented against a deterministic background scenario. In the high 
affect case presented to the subjects, a man stalks and rapes a stranger; in the low affect case a 
man cheats on his taxes (ibid.: 675). When subjects were presented with the high affect case they 
where more inclined to ascribe full moral responsibility (64%) than when they were presented 
with the low affect scenario (23%) (ibid.: 676). The question, again, is why this is so? As Nichols 
and Knobe argue, it is plausible that emotions affect our judgments, but why? 
 
Psychological vs. Mechanistic explanations 
Nahmias et al (2007) argue that what keeps people from assigning responsibility is reductionism 
and mechanistic explanations of people’s behavior, not determinism (Cf. Green and Cohen 2004). 
They set up an experiment in which subjects in a reductionist condition were confronted with 
a deterministic scenario in which neuroscientists have discovered the chemical reactions and 
neural processes in our brains that completely cause our decisions and actions, and are 
themselves completely caused by events preceding our births. By contrast, subjects in the non-
reductionist condition were confronted with a scenario in which psychologists had discovered the 
thoughts, desires and plans in our minds that completely cause our decisions and actions, and are 
themselves caused by events preceding our births. 
When subjects were asked to what extent they agreed that people in this deterministic scenario 
should be held responsible for their actions, the level of agreement was significantly lower among 
subjects in the reductionist condition: 41% agreed at least somewhat vs. 87% in the non-
reductionist condition (Nahmias et. al. 2007: 227). 
Again, the question is why we get these results. It is conceivable that incompatibilist reactions 
to abstract scenarios that are neutral between reductionist and non-reductionist interpretations are 
partially due to subject’s understanding them along reductionist lines. But if this is the case, it 
still leaves questions of why we give them a reductionist interpretation, why we take reductionism 
to undermine responsibility, and why affect significantly affects judgments. 
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Positive and negative side effects 
A study by Knobe (2003) suggests that people are significantly more inclined to hold an agent 
responsible for bringing about bad side effects than for bringing about good side effects when the 
agent just doesn’t care about these side effects. Subjects were presented with two scenarios 
involving a chairman of a board who takes no interest in environmental effects of his decisions. 
In one scenario, he knowingly allows a profitable program that will harm the environment; in the 
other he allows a profitable program that will benefit the environment. Subjects in the harm 
condition assigned a high degree of blameworthiness (4.8 on a 0 to 6 scale), whereas subjects in 
the benefit condition assigned a very low (1.4) degree of praiseworthiness (Knobe 2003: 193). 
Again, the question is how to explain the difference. 
 
The explanatory component of moral responsibility 
We will suggest that these four experimental results are all well explained by the fact that our 
everyday idea of an agent’s being morally responsible for an outcome involves the idea that the 
outcome is explained by the agent’s motivation in normal ways. 
The central hypothesis – call it the “explanation hypothesis” – is the following: 
 
The Explanation Hypothesis: People take P to be morally responsible for an outcome or 
action E to the extent that they take E to be explained in normal ways by some motivational 
structure of P that is of a kind that can be modified by reactive attitudes.2 
                                                
2 More precisely, the Explanation Hypothesis says that people take P to be morally responsible for E to the extent 
that they take GET, RR and ER to be satisfied: 
 
General Explanatory Tendency (GET): There is a reasonably common condition C such that motivational 
structures of type M explain outcomes (actions, events) of type O given C while motivational structures of type 
M’ explain outcomes of type O’ given C, where M and M’ as well as O and O’ are mutually exclusive.  
 
Reactive Response-ability (RR): Generally speaking, whether people exemplify M or M’ depends on whether 
they are subject to being held responsible for realizing or not preventing O or O’. 
 
Explanatory Responsibility (ER): P has a motivational structure, S, of type M; E is of type O; C holds; and S is 
part of a significant explanation of E (in the normal way that M-motivation explains O-outcomes given C).  
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The hypothesis is not meant to explain everything that people say about moral responsibility, but 
we suggest that it is responsible for most typical intuitions about moral responsibility, including 
the reactions that are driving the philosophical debate. 
There are two kinds of reason to accept the explanation hypothesis. Elsewhere, we have 
argued that one can expect something like the explanation hypothesis to be true given the role 
judgments of moral responsibility serve in governing our reactive attitudes. For these attitudes to 
serve their social function of controlling and shaping motivational structures and promoting and 
prevent various events, they need to be directed towards the sort of motivational structures that 
(a) are causally responsible for these events in systematic ways and (b) respond to reactive 
attitudes in the appropriate way. Since they are directed by our concept of moral responsibility, it 
is reasonable to expect that concept to keep track of just these conditions. And this, of course, is 
just what the explanation hypothesis says that our judgments of moral responsibility do. 
 This functionalist story is enough to make the explanation hypothesis interesting, but what is 
more important is its capacity to explain a number of general features of ordinary thinking about 
moral responsibility. For example, it seems plausible that our sensitivity to whether outcomes are 
explained by kinds of motivation that are modifiable by reactive attitudes is what leads people to 
assign diminished moral responsibility for compulsive behavior or for behavior performed under 
extreme emotional stress.3 Moreover, we generally take people to be responsible for things that 
would not have taken place if they had been motivated by different things or to a different degree: 
for outcomes that are explained in normal ways by their desires for such outcomes, and to be 
responsible for bad outcomes that are explained in normal ways by their lack of concern for such 
outcomes. And we generally do not take people to be responsible for things that they are 
physically forced to do, or for outcomes that no one could possibly have predicted: in such cases, 
the agent’s motivation is typically explanatorily irrelevant for the outcome.  
                                                                                                                                                        
 
3 Here it is important to keep in mind that the explanation hypothesis is concerned with motivational structures of 
certain types, not with the instantiation of motivational structures in a particular individual. If a reckless driver dies 
as he crashes into another car, we hold that driver responsible even though death obviously prevents any further 
changes to the motivational structure. 
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The explanation hypothesis has much more interesting consequences, however, having to do 
with the fact that the notion of what explains E is selective in a certain way. Ordinarily, when we 
are looking for the causal explanation of some event or condition, E, we are not trying to 
assemble any or all conditions or events that can be said to make a causal contribution to the 
occurrence of that event; we are not asking for a complete and maximally detailed description of 
its causal origins, or a complete explanation of why it came about. We are trying to identify some 
especially interesting explanatory condition, X. 
Typically, X only provides a causal explanation of E given a number of further conditions, C, 
which we might call the supporting conditions of X’s explaining E. Nevertheless, as we think that 
X explains E, our focus is on X and E, while C is part of the cognitive background of our 
thought; cognitively, X and E are treated as variables, while C is treated as a constant. Other parts 
of a maximally detailed description of how E came about are neither seen as explaining E, nor as 
supporting conditions for X’s explaining E. Some of these are the conditions or events that 
explain X, which are ignored as our focus lies on the explanatory connection between X and E. 
Others are causal upshots of X and intermediary causal steps between X and E. Like E, these are 
understood as dependent on X, but get less focus than E when we focus on the thought that X 
explains E.  
One of the factors that determine whether X is an interesting cause of E is whether X is more 
remarkable, surprising or out of the ordinary than the background conditions (cf. Hart and 
Honoré 1985: 33-44). When the smoke detector sounds its alarm, a complete causal explanation 
of the event will include various facts about the wiring of the detector, the fact that it has a good 
battery, and the presence of smoke. However, given that we expect the detector to be in good 
working order, what we would think of as explaining the alarm is the presence of smoke. If we 
had expected the presence of smoke but not that of the battery, we would have thought of the 
latter condition as what explained the alarm. 
The interest-relativity of everyday explanatory judgments is well known, but has surprising 
explanatory power when our judgments of moral responsibility are understood as selective and 
interest relative in this way. Elsewhere, we have argued that it explains patterns of everyday 
excuses, such as the presence of threats, lack of control, conformity to socially expected pattern 
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(“just did my job”) and lack of active involvement (“I was just an innocent bystander”). Here, we 
will see how it explains our puzzling set of experimental results. 
 
Explaining the results 
We begin with the question of why people are less prone to ascribe responsibility to actions set in 
a deterministic scenario when these actions are abstractly characterized than when they are 
concrete. According to the explanation hypothesis, this must be because characterizations affect 
the explanatory judgments that we are ready to make. In this case, two factors lead away from the 
kind of explanatory interests that govern everyday judgments of responsibility and typically lead 
us to assign responsibility to intended outcomes of actions: the abstracting away from any 
particulars of the case, and the focus on conditions that explain the motivational structure of the 
agent without themselves being explained by that structure.  
These two aspects combine to make motivational structures of agents explanatorily 
insignificant. First, when a cause of an event is itself caused by another event, our explanatory 
judgments will typically focus on the prior cause, unless the prior cause forces us to make 
assumptions that were not already taken for granted. For illustration, suppose that we knew the 
following: 
 
Sam arrived late for a meeting. One driver had been using her mobile phone, while another 
was having an argument with his wife; both were slow to react to changes in traffic and 
bumped into each other. One thing led to another, and a number of cars crashed hard into 
each other, blocking three out of four lanes for over an hour. Sam spent over 40 minutes 
behind slow-moving cars that were stuck behind other slow-moving cars, … , making their 
way past the site of the accident. 
 
In briefly answering the question why Sam arrived late, we would presumably pick out from the 
chain of events the fact that a road accident had blocked all but one lane. This would provide an 
explanation of both the slow traffic and the fact that Sam was late, without invoking assumptions 
that were not already part of common background assumptions; that accidents blocking most 
lanes cause traffic congestion and late arrivals goes without saying. We would probably not just 
say that Sam got stuck behind slow-moving cars, as that would seem to imply that there was no 
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significant explanation of why the cars were moving slowly. Nor would we be likely to mention 
the causes of the accident. Since arguments and telephone calls in cars typically do not lead to 
accidents, these prior causes would only make the late arrival intelligible if supplied by further 
assumptions making it clear that an accident followed and that cars were blocking the lanes. 
Although more would be explained, the explanation would be much less straightforward. 
In this case, and when we normally assign responsibility, an explanatory regress is blocked by 
the fact that invoking prior causes would unduly complicate the explanation. But in the case of an 
abstractly characterized action set in a deterministic scenario, we are led to abstract away from 
the particulars and think in terms of events caused by prior events, thus eradicating differences in 
perceived explanatory complexity between an agent’s motivation and what might be enormously 
complex sets of prior conditions causally responsible for that motivation. For this reason, nothing 
counteracts our tendency to prefer prior causes. When we ask for what explains a certain action, 
nothing picks out the motivation of the agent as particularly interesting. Given the explanation 
hypothesis, that means that agents will not seem to be responsible for their actions. 
When an agent’s actions are described in more detail, everyday explanatory interests will 
instead become more salient, and our tendency to focus on prior causes less pronounced. This, we 
suggest, is what explains the contrast in judgments of responsibility between abstract and 
concrete conditions in the experiments by Nichols and Knobe (2007). But it also provides a 
straightforward explanation of why subjects more readily ascribe responsibility in cases of 
intuitively more serious moral transgressions or “high affect” cases than they do in “low affect” 
cases. The reason is simply that more serious cases are more prone to grab our attention and thus 
more prone to prevent us from ignoring the particulars of the case and looking further back in the 
causal chain. 
 The explanation hypothesis provides a similar account of why a reductive, neurological, 
deterministic scenario undermines judgments of explanation much more strongly than a non-
reductive, psychological scenario. Again, the reason is that the former case is more likely to 
change our explanatory interests. In the reductive scenario, we are not only lead to adopt a new 
set of explanatory categories (chemical and neurological processes) but also, perhaps, to discard 
our everyday explanations of human action, whereas the explanatory categories postulated in the 
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non-reductive scenario coincide with those employed in everyday explanatory discourse. Given 
the explanation hypothesis, the results provided by Nahmias et. al. (2007) are to be expected. 
 Finally, consider the question of why people are significantly more inclined to hold an agent 
responsible for bringing about bad side effects than for bringing about good side effects when the 
agent just doesn’t care about these side effects. The reason, we suggest, is simply that in the case 
with the bad side effects but not in the case with the good side effects, we take the agent’s lack of 
motivation to explain the outcome: in the first scenario, we want to say that the environment was 
damaged because the chair of the board didn’t care; in the second, we simply do not want to say 
that the environment was helped because of some aspects of the chair’s motivation.  
 
Final remarks 
In this paper, we have argued that the explanation hypothesis accounts for the puzzling and 
seemingly incoherent variety of intuitions about moral responsibility that has been revealed by 
recent work in experimental philosophy. Much more can be said, of course, about possible 
alternative explanations, about whether the explanation hypothesis can explain other aspects of 
our thinking about moral responsibility. Moreover, the very fact that the explanation hypothesis 
might be able to explain a seemingly incoherent variety of intuitions leaves the question of which 
intuitions we should rely on when considering whether moral responsibility is compatible with 
determinism. But these questions are better left for another occasion. 
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